The majority of neo-corporatist scholars consider the two aspects of corporatism to be so closely related that they can be regarded as a single phenomenon. We shall follow their example.
Consensus democracy differs from majoritarian democracy along two dimensions. Each dimension consists of a cluster of interrelated variables. The variables included in the first dimension are the type of executive (oversized cabinets, typical of consensus democracy, vs. minimal winning cabinets, typical of majoritarian democracy), executive-legislative relations (balanced power vs. executive dominance respectively), the party system (multiparty vs. two-party systems), the number of issue dimensions in the party system (multidimensional systems vs. systems divided exclusively by the socio-economic cleavage) and the electoral system (proportional vs. plurality and majority systems). The second dimension consists of three variables: the degree of government centralization (decentralized vs. centralized rule), the type of legislature (strong bicameralism vs, unicameralism) and the degree of constitutional flexibility (written and rigid vs., at the other extreme, unwritten constitutions).' Corporatism, in the broad sense that includes interest group concertation, obviously has a strong conceptual affinity with the first dimension; in fact, the central element of this dimension of consensus democracy may well be described as party concertation or the concertation of partisan interests. Hence, our hypothesis concerning the link between corporatism and consensus focuses on the first dimension of consensus democracy. We do not expect corporatism and the second dimension to be correlated.
The scholarly literature on corporatism has concentrated more on the consequences than on the causes of corporatism. The general verdict has been highly favourable to corporatism; in particular, its macro-economic performance measured in terms of high growth, low unemployment and low inflation rates, has been found to be superior to that of pluralist system^.^ More recently, scholars have begun to dissent from this sanguine interpretation,' and it has even been claimed that corporatism is generally in d e~l i n e .~ It is important to note that the latter claim refers to the declining eficacy of corporatism rather than the decline of corporatism as a system of interest group organization and concertation. For our purposes, the attempts to isolate the causes of corporatism are of special interest since they provide alternative hypotheses to our main hypothesis that corporatism is an element in the syndrome of characteristics that make up consensus democracy.
In his recent synoptic volume on corporatist theory, Peter J. Williamson lists two explanatory variables. One is the degree of influence of the political left in the government, the theoretical explanation of this causal link being that 'promoting working-class interests within the framework of capitalism is an essential ingredient for the success of corporatism because it facilitates trade union involvement in a cooperative manner'.' Many authors have noted this important relation~hip.~ The second variable is the size of the country, and Williamson speculates that 'in smaller countries there is less socio-economic differentiation, and [this] allows for a more unified and centralized macro-structure' of interest group^.^ Peter J. Katzenstein has suggested the alternative explanation that it is the economic openness and vulnerability of small countries that is the key to their development of corporatism as a protective device.'' This research note is the first explicit attempt to link corporatism to consensus democracy and to test their relationship empirically, but previous analyses have emphasized the conceptual affinity between consociationalism -which has many resemblances to consensus democracy -and corporatism. For instance, Gerhard Lehmbruch speaks of 'the structural isomorphy of the "consociational" and "liberal corporatist" pattern. In both, bargaining and log-rolling serve to reconcile the conflicting interests of highly cohesive groups which cannot be adjusted by electoral competition andlor by majoritarian devices'." And Kenneth D. both require a 'disposition among elites towards collaborative or cooperative, rather than authoritative or majoritarian, modes of decision-making'."
M E A S U R E M E N T
Twelve neo-corporatist scholars have proposed measures of corporatism, and instead of adding an entirely new thirteenth measure we decided to use the combined wisdom of these scholars." Generally speaking, the countries to which they apply their measurements are the industrialized Western democracies and Japan, but there are slight differences in their coverage of countries. We included those countries for which at least six scholarly judgements were available: a total of eighteen countries (listed in Table  1 ).14 The measures were proposed between 1976 and 1986, and they refer to the situation in these countries from the late 1950s through the 1970s. Because the types of measurement proposed by the different authors vary widely (from a simple dichotomous classification to rank orderings and interval scales), we standardized the values of each measure and used the averages for each country (again standardized) as our composite measure of corporatism. Figure I shows our eighteen countries arranged from the most corporatist to the least corporatist (or the most pluralist). For each country, it also shows the standard deviation bar indicating the degree to which the twelve experts agreed on where to place the country in question. There is little disagreement on the placement of the International Organization, 41 (1987), 203-23, p. 215. countries at the ends of the scale: corporatist Austria, Norway and Sweden, and pluralist Canada and the United States. In the middle of the scale, there is more disagreement -Switzerland, France and Italy and, especially, Japan are controversial cases. These divergent judgements reflect well-known differences in the corporatist literature both with regard to conceptions of corporatism and with regard to the interpretation of these particular cases. Our measure of consensus democracy is based on the operational definition of the first dimension of consensus democracy in Democracies with two small adj~stments.'~ In the first place, we believe that Democracies applies the definition of minimum winning coalition in too formalistic a manner to the so-called 'great coalitions ' in Austria (1945-66) and Germany (196669) . These coalitions were technically minimal coalitions most of the time (in Austria, from 1949 to 1966), since neither party in the coalition was a majority party. Substantively, however, such extremely broad coalitions -based on approximately 90 per cent parliamentary support -should be classified with the oversized cabinets. Secondly, Democracies uses factor scores as the operational measure of consensus democracy. Since these entail a highly unequal weighting of the five components of consensus, and since there is no strong theoretical reason to do any weighting at all, our alternative is to use the unweighted averages (that is, the standardized means of the standardized values of the five variables). This consensus measure is based on data from the late 1940s to 1980, a period that corresponds roughly with the period on which our corporatism measure is based. Democracies treats twenty-two democratic systems. We use only eighteen of these because our data on corporatism are limited to eighteen countries; the French Fourth Republic, Iceland, Israel and Luxembourg had to be omitted.
In order to test our other hypotheses, we also need measures of the influence of the political left in the government, degree of economic openness and population size. For the first of these, we used Manfred G . Schmidt's five-point scale of dominant tendency in government, ranging from social democratic hegemony to bourgeois hegemony, based on indicators of the strength, duration and cohesiveness of the two tendencies.16 For each country, Schmidt provides ratings for three time spans from the 1950s through the 1970s: 1950-60, 1960-75 and 1974-78 . Unfortunately, the last two periods overlap slightly, but the three periods together match our periods for consensus democracy and corporatism very nicely. Our measure is the mean of these three values, weighted according to the length of time to which the value applies. Our measure of economic openness is Ronald Rogowski's variable of trade as a share of GDP, and we also use the population figures (logged, as usual) that he supplies." By using independently collected data for all of our variables, we believe that we can subject both our main hypothesis and the alternative hypotheses to the most objective and fairest test. Table  1 contains our basic data on corporatism, consensus, social democratic power and economic openness. Table 2 and Figure 2 show the relationship between corporatism and consensus democracy. The simple correlation coefficient is 0.57, which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level and in fact nearly at the 0.01 level as well. This means that the degree of consensus explains almost a third -about 32 per cent -of the variance in corporatism (the adjusted percentage of explained variance is 28 per cent). The details of the relationship are shown in Figure 2 . As the degree of consensus democracy increases, the degree of corporatism increases. Both variables are standardized, and an increase of one standard deviation in consensus democracy yields an increase of more than half a standard deviation in corporatism. The corporatist and consensus democracies -the Nordic and Benelux countries -are clustered in the upper right-hand quadrant and the pluralist and majoritarian democracies -mainly English-speaking countries -in the lower left-hand corner.
There are four strikingly deviant cases, that is, cases that are at a considerable distance from the regression line in Figure 2 : Austria, Norway, Sweden and Italy. The Austrian deviance partly reflects a measurement problem. While Austria is undoubtedly placed in the correct position as far as corporatism is concerned -Austria is widely regarded as the 'paradigm case' of corporatism -its score on the consensus scale appears to be too low, since Austria is also generally considered to be a consensually oriented democracy. One of the measurement problems is that Austria has had a two-party system, which makes it look like a majoritarian democracy; however, in the Austrian case, the two-party system is not created and maintained by a disproportional electoral system but by the natural dichotomous division of Austrian society. Another problem is that the degree of balance in executive-legislative relations is measured in terms of cabinet durability; this operationalization works well in most cases, but the longevity of Austria's cabinets yields an exaggerated picture of cabinet predominance. If these measurement problems could be corrected, Austria would undoubtedly be less of a deviant case. Another part of the explanation of the deviant position of Austria is suggested by the cases of Norway and Sweden, which are located close to Austria in Figure 2 . These are substantively deviant cases with a degree of corporatism that cannot be adequately explained by their degree of consensus democracy. The strength of the Social Democrats in the government of these countries is an additional explanation, to which we shall turn shortly.
Italy is also a true deviant case: it is high on consensus democracy but low on corporatism. These judgements are confirmed in Joseph LaPalombara's recent interpretation of the nature of Italian democracy. He describes Italy as a 'partitocrazia' with broad participation of all parties in policy making and a strong inclination to seek consensus: 'it is not just the party or parties that constitute the government that make public policies, but the parties of the opposition as well'. Moreover, party leaders have a deep 'aversion to divisive confrontations'. On the other hand, corporatism in Italy is virtually nonexistent; for one thing, he argues, corporatism 'requires very strong trade union and industrial organization, whereas these organizations, especially the trade unions, are quite weak'. LaPalombara then even argues that partitocrazia and corporatism should be regarded as incompatible.18 While this conclusion is too extreme, it can certainly be argued that corporatism and consensus are alternative methods of concertation and that weakness in interest group concertation may be compensated for by strong party concertation. This appears to be the case in Italy, but it is obviously not a general pattern in industrial democracies. If it were, we would find a negative relationship between consensus democracy and corporatism instead of the positive relationship that we actually find, as shown in Figure 2 . While we find our principal hypothesis concerning the bivariate link between consensus democracy and corporatism amply confirmed, we must also consider the three alternative explanatory variables suggested in the neo-corporatist literature, since the impact of consensus democracy may look much weaker in a controlled multivariate context. Also, while consensus democracy explains almost a third of the variance in corporatism, this leaves more than two-thirds unexplained. As Table 2 indicates, all three variables are strongly and significantly correlated with corporatism. The dominant tendency in government is an especially strong variable -considerably stronger, in fact, than consensus democracy. Figure 3 shows the details of this relationship. As social democratic influence in government increases, the degree of corporatism increases: for each unit increase on the five-point scale of left-wing influence, there is an increase of almost three-fourths of a unit (standard deviation) in corporatism. The principal outliers are the Netherlands and Japan, which have a higher degree, and New Zealand and the United Kingdom, which have a lower degree of corporatism than expected on the basis of the degree of left-wing influence in their governments. In all four cases, it is the degree of consensus democracy that explains their degree of corporatism better.
Economic openness is also strongly correlated with corporatism, almost as strongly as consensus democracy; and the correlation between population size and corporatism, while weaker, is still significant at the 0.10 per cent level. The fact that we find four independent variables that are all significantly related to corporatism suggests that they are likely to be correlated among themselves; as discussed earlier, we can also expect this to be the case on theoretical grounds for the economic openness and population variables. Hence, a controlled test is called for, and Table 2 also supplies the standardized regression coefficients (betas) in the multiple regression equation. Very clearly, the dominant tendency in government maintains its status as the most powerful explanatory factor, and it stays ahead of consensus democracy; but the latter remains a strong second influence. On the other hand, economic openness and population size are no longer significant factors. As far'as the strength of consensus democracy as an explanation of corporatism is concerned, it is important to note that the beta of 0.41 is still both strong and statistically significant at the 0.05 level -and again almost at the 0.01 level, too. In other words, it survives the imposition of these controls very well. The total amount of variance explained by the four independent variables is 77 per cent (the adjusted R2 equals 70 per cent), most of which is contributed by dominant tendency in government and consensus democracy. In a stepwise regression procedure, dominant tendency in government explains 53 per cent of the variance (adjusted R~= 50 per cent), but consensus democracy adds a very sizable 22 per cent (R2=21 per cent) to this for a total of 75 per cent (adjusted R2= 71 per cent).
C O N C L U S I O N So far our analysis has treated corporatism as the dependent and consensus democracy as the independent variable, and we have been able to prove that consensus democracy is indeed an important independent or explanatory variable. It does not explain everything -in fact, the dominant tendency in government explains more -but it provides significant additional explanation even when the alternative explanations are controlled for. This finding has also brought us closer to our second aim: showing that corporatism can be thought of as a component of a more broadly defined concept of consensus democracy. For this latter purpose, of course, the treatment of one variable as the dependent and the other as the independent variable was merely a matter of convenience. One question remains: does corporatism belong to consensus democracy as strongly as the original cluster of five closely related characteristics? The best way to answer this question is to compare the correlation coefficients among the five original variables with the correlation coefficients between corporatism and each of these variables. The respective averages are 0.48 and 0.43. This means that corporatism can indeed be considered a true, albeit slightly weaker, component of the syndrome of characteristics that make up consensus democracy. (It is worth emphasizing again here that we are only dealing with the first dimension of consensus democracy. The second, federalunitary, dimension is, as hypothesized earlier, not connected with pluralism at all: the correlation coefficient is exactly 0.00.) On the basis of the theoretical and empirical justifications presented above, we can now present our broader measure of consensus democracy simply by adding our standardized measure of corporatism to the standardized values of the other five variables and by averaging these six items (and then standardizing the averages). The values of this broader measure are presented for our eighteen countries, rank ordered from the most consensual to the most majoritarian, in the third column of Table 3 . This new rank order does not differ a great deal from the rank order based on the values of our old five-item measure of consensus democracy in Table 1 . The only noteworthy shifts are that Austria moves up and Japan moves down two places. The similarity of the two rank orderings is not unexpected since we have added a component that is closely related to the original elements. For this reason, we do not reproduce the old five-item measure in Table 3 .
The more interesting comparison -which is shown in Table 3 , in the first column -is with the rank order of the eighteen countries on the first dimension of consensus democracy as reported in Democracies. In comparing these two rank orderings, we should remember that the differences are not only the result of the addition of corporatism but also, to an important extent, of the effect of our use of standardized averages instead of the standardized factor scores used in Democracies (and, to a minor extent, of our classification of the two 'great coalitions' as oversized rather than minimum winning cabinets).
Thirteen of our eighteen countries still do not shift at all in the line-up or else move only one or two ranks up or down. A few larger shifts stand out, however: France, Canada and Japan move down, and Germany and Austria move up a considerable distance. We suggest that most of the new ranks, especially Austria's, are improvements over those yielded by the old five-item measure, since they are more in accordance with how the style of democracy in these countries is usually described. The main exception is Canada whose bottom rank is undoubtedly too low. Our measure is unable to recognize Canada's many informal consensual norms which to some extent counteract its formally majoritarian institutions on the first dimension; as far as the second, federalunitary, dimension is concerned, Canada is obviously on the extreme federal<onsensual end of the scale. Austria's rank is probably still too low, as a result of the measurement problems discussed earlier; but its removal from the bottom rank is a distinct improvement.
One of the explanations offered in Democracies for the different degrees of consensus or majoritarianism found in different countries is the strength of Anglo-American political culture and traditions.19 The new line-up proves this pattern even more clearly: all six of the English-speaking, or mainly English-speaking, countries are clustered together at the very bottom (the majoritarian end) of the rank order. We suggest that other attempts to determine the causes and consequences of consensus democracy will also be more fruitful if our new six-item measure is used: it is a more inclusive and richer measure which reflects the basic properties of consensus vs. majoritarianism more accurately.
l9 Lijphart, Democracies, p. 221.
